Takeover theory and the law and economics movement

Research Handbook on the Economics of Corporate Law

Volumn , Issue , 2012, Pages 216-231

  Davidoff, Steven M ^a  

^a OHIO UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84881849998     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4337/9781781005217.00019     Document Type: Chapter

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