Defensive mechanisms and managerial discretion

Journal of Finance

Volumn 52, Issue 4, 1997, Pages 1467-1493

  Giammarino, Ronald ^a   Heinkel, Robert ^a   Hollifield, Burton ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0039470136     PISSN: 00221082     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb01117.x     Document Type: Article

References (22)

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