Economic institutions and the state: Insights from economic history

Annual Review of Sociology

Volumn 39, Issue , 2013, Pages 251-273

  Hillmann, Henning ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MANNHEIM   (Germany)

Author keywords

Credible commitments; Economic history; Institutional mechanisms; Private order institutions

Indexed keywords

EID: 84880519570     PISSN: 03600572     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1146/annurev-soc-071811-145436     Document Type: Review

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