Mixed strategy under generalized public goods games

Journal of Theoretical Biology

Volumn 334, Issue , 2013, Pages 52-60

  Zhang, Yanling ^a   Wu, Te ^a   Chen, Xiaojie ^b   Xie, Guangming ^a   Wang, Long ^a  

^a PEKING UNIVERSITY   (China)

^b INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR APPLIED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS   (Austria)

Author keywords

Adaptive dynamics; Finite populations; Nonlinear production function

Indexed keywords

CONVERGENT EVOLUTION; EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE STRATEGY; GAME THEORY; GROUP SIZE; POPULATION SIZE; PUBLIC GOODS;

ARTICLE; BRANCHING MORPHOGENESIS; CONVERGENT EVOLUTION; CONVERGENT EVOLUTIONARY STABLE STRATEGY; GAME; HYSTERESIS; MIXED STRATEGY; NONLINEAR SYSTEM; POPULATION DYNAMICS; POPULATION SIZE; PRIORITY JOURNAL; PROBABILITY; STATISTICAL ANALYSIS;

ADAPTIVE DYNAMICS; FINITE POPULATIONS; NONLINEAR PRODUCTION FUNCTION;

ALGORITHMS; ANIMALS; BIOLOGICAL EVOLUTION; ECOSYSTEM; GAME THEORY; HUMANS; MODELS, BIOLOGICAL; POPULATION DENSITY; POPULATION DYNAMICS; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR;

EID: 84879624942     PISSN: 00225193     EISSN: 10958541     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2013.05.011     Document Type: Article

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