Taxation and Development

Handbook of Public Economics

Volumn 5, Issue , 2013, Pages 51-110

  Besley, Timothy ^a,b   Persson, Torsten ^b,c  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

^b CANADIAN INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED RESEARCH   (Canada)

^c STOCKHOLM UNIVERSITY   (Sweden)

Author keywords

Administration and compliance; Development; Fiscal capacity; Revenue authorities; Taxation

Indexed keywords

EID: 84879530935     PISSN: 15734420     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/B978-0-444-53759-1.00002-9     Document Type: Chapter

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