Mindreading in Gettier Cases and Skeptical Pressure Cases

Knowledge Ascriptions

Volumn , Issue , 2012, Pages

  Nagel, Jennifer ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO   (Canada)

Author keywords

Gettier; Intuition; Knowledge ascription; Mindreading; Skepticism

Indexed keywords

EID: 84879417218     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693702.003.0008     Document Type: Chapter

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