Evolutionary dynamics of climate change under collective-risk dilemmas

Mathematical Models and Methods in Applied Sciences

Volumn 22, Issue SUPPL.1, 2012, Pages

  Santos, Francisco C ^a,b   Vasconcelos, Vítor V ^b   Santos, Marta D ^b   Neves, P N B ^b   Pacheco, Jorge M ^b,c  

^a UNIVERSIDADE NOVA DE LISBOA   (Portugal)

^b ATP Group CMAF Instituto Para A Investigação Interdisciplinar   (Portugal)

^c UNIVERSITY OF MINHO   (Portugal)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS; EVOLUTIONARY GAMES; FINITE POPULATION; SMALL GROUPS; STOCHASTIC DYNAMICS; STRINGENT REQUIREMENT; TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS;

GAME THEORY; GLOBAL WARMING;

DYNAMICS;

EID: 84857875076     PISSN: 02182025     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1142/S0218202511400045     Document Type: Article

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