Why charities announce donations: A positive perspective

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 81, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 423-447

  Romano, Richard ^a   Yildirim, Huseyin ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA   (United States)

Author keywords

Charity; H41; L31; Voluntary contributions

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038134662     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00078-5     Document Type: Article

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