Retrospective voting reconsidered

Annual Review of Political Science

Volumn 16, Issue , 2013, Pages 285-306

  Healy, Andrew ^a   Malhotra, Neil ^b  

^a LOYOLA MARYMOUNT UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Citizen competence; Democratic accountability; Economic voting; Voting behavior

Indexed keywords

EID: 84877908576     PISSN: 10942939     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1146/annurev-polisci-032211-212920     Document Type: Review

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