Do voters demand responsive governments? Evidence from Indian disaster relief

Journal of Development Economics

Volumn 97, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 167-181

  Cole, Shawn ^a   Healy, Andrew ^b   Werker, Eric ^a  

^a HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL   (United States)

^b LOYOLA MARYMOUNT UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Disaster relief; Government expenditures; India; Political economy; Voting

Indexed keywords

ACCOUNTABILITY; DISASTER RELIEF; ELECTORAL SYSTEM; PARTY POLITICS; POLITICAL ECONOMY; PUBLIC SPENDING; RAINFALL; VOTING BEHAVIOR;

INDIA;

EID: 82455167903     PISSN: 03043878     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2011.05.005     Document Type: Article

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