The costs of shareholder activism: Evidence from a sequential decision model

Journal of Financial Economics

Volumn 107, Issue 3, 2013, Pages 610-631

  Gantchev, Nickolay ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA   (United States)

Author keywords

Corporate governance; Hedge funds; Institutional investors; Monitoring; Shareholder activism

Indexed keywords

EID: 84875503821     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.09.007     Document Type: Article

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