The effects of management-board ties on IPO performance

Journal of Corporate Finance

Volumn 21, Issue 1, 2013, Pages 153-179

  Chahine, Salim ^a   Goergen, Marc ^b,c  

^a AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT   (Lebanon)

^b CARDIFF UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

^c European Corporate Governance Institute   (Belgium)

Author keywords

Alignment of interest; Entrenchment; Family tie; IPO performance; Q analysis; Social tie

Indexed keywords

EID: 84875244742     PISSN: 09291199     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2013.02.001     Document Type: Article

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