Do Agents "Run Amok"? A Comparison of Agency Slack in the EU and US Trade Policy in the Doha Round

Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice

Volumn 15, Issue 1, 2013, Pages 21-36

  da Conceição Heldt, Eugénia ^a  

^a DRESDEN UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84874774019     PISSN: 13876988     EISSN: 15725448     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13876988.2012.754152     Document Type: Article

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