How agents weaken their principals' incentives to control: The case of EU negotiators and EU member states in multilateral negotiations

Journal of European Integration

Volumn 32, Issue 4, 2010, Pages 357-374

  Delreux, Tom ^a   Kerremans, Bart ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LEUVEN   (Belgium)

Author keywords

European Commission; International environmental negotiations; International trade negotiations; Presidency; Principal agent

Indexed keywords

EID: 79956253249     PISSN: 07036337     EISSN: 14772280     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/07036331003797554     Document Type: Article

References (16)

1. Arksey, H. and P. Knight. 1999. Interviewing for social scientists. London: Sage Publications.
2. Damro, C. 2007. EU delegation and agency in international trade negotiations: a cautionary comparison. Journal of Common Market Studies 45, no. 4: 883-903.
3. Delreux, T. 2008. The EU as a negotiator in multilateral chemicals negotiations: multiple principals, different agents. Journal of European Public Policy 15, no. 7: 1069-86.
4. Delreux, T. 2009a. Cooperation and control in the European Union. The case of the European Union as international environmental negotiator. Cooperation and Conflict 44, no. 2: 189-208.
5. Delreux, T. 2009b. The EU negotiates multilateral environmental agreements: explaining the agent's discretion. Journal of European Public Policy 16, no. 5: 719-37.
6. Epstein, D. and S. O'Halloran. 1999. Delegating powers. A transaction cost politics approach to policy making under separate powers. New York: Cambridge University Press.
7. Kerremans, B. 1993. Besluitvorming en integratie in de externe economische betrekkingen van de Europese Gemeenschap (Decision-making and integration in the external economic relations of the European Community). Antwerp: Universitaire Instellingen Antwerpen.
8. Kerremans, B. 2004. What went wrong in Cancun? A principal-agent view on the EU's rationale towards the Doha development round. European Foreign Affairs Review 9, no. 3: 363-93.
9. Kerremans, B. 2006. Pro-active policy entrepreneur or risk minimizer? A principal-agent interpretation of the EU's role in the WTO. In The European Union's roles in international politics, eds. O. Elgström and M. Smith, 172-88. Oxford: Routledge.
10. Moravcsik, A. 1993. Introduction. Integrating international and domestic theories of international bargaining. In International bargaining and domestic politics. Double-edged diplomacy, eds. P. Evans, H. Jacobson and R. Putnam, 3-42. Los Angeles: University of California Press.
11. Nielson, D. and M. Tierney. (2003) Delegation to international organisations: agency theory and World Bank environmental reform. International Organization 57, no. 2: 241-76.
12. Pollack, M. 2003. The engines of European integration. Delegation, agency, and agenda setting in the EU. New York: Oxford University Press.
13. Putnam, R. 1988. Diplomacy and domestic policies: the logic of two-level games. International Organization 42, no. 3: 427-60.
14. Shapiro, S. 2005. Agency theory. Annual Review of Sociology 31: 263-84.
15. Tallberg, J. 2002. Delegation to supranational institutions: why, how, and with what consequences? West European Politics 25, no. 1: 23-46.
16. Young, A. 2003. What game? By which rules? Adapting and flexibility in the EC's foreign economic policy. In Understanding the European Union's external relations, eds. M. Knodt and S. Princen, 54-71. London: Routledge.