The impact of human rights INGO activities on economic sanctions

Review of International Organizations

Volumn 8, Issue 1, 2013, Pages 33-53

  Murdie, Amanda ^a   Peksen, Dursun ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MEMPHIS   (United States)

Author keywords

Economic sanctions; Human rights; Human rights INGOs; International sanctions; Naming and shaming activities; Political repression

Indexed keywords

EID: 84873717484     PISSN: 15597431     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11558-012-9146-9     Document Type: Article

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