Economic war and democratic peace

Conflict Management and Peace Science

Volumn 24, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 171-182

  Goenner, Cullen F ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NORTH DAKOTA   (United States)

Author keywords

Democratic peace; Economic sanctions; Trade interdependence

Indexed keywords

EID: 34547784063     PISSN: 07388942     EISSN: 15499219     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/07388940701468435     Document Type: Article

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