Fashion, Cooperation, and Social Interactions

PLoS ONE

Volumn 8, Issue 1, 2013, Pages

  Cao, Zhigang ^a   Gao, Haoyu ^a   Qu, Xinglong ^a   Yang, Mingmin ^a   Yang, Xiaoguang ^a  

^a CHINESE ACADEMY OF SCIENCES   (China)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; COMPETITION; COOPERATION; CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY; FASHION; GAME; HUMAN; MODEL; POPULATION DYNAMICS; SATISFACTION; SIMULATION; SOCIAL ASPECT; SOCIAL INTERACTION; SOCIAL NETWORK; SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY; SOCIAL STRUCTURE;

COMPUTER SIMULATION; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; CULTURE; HUMANS; INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS;

EID: 84873205979     PISSN: None     EISSN: 19326203     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0049441     Document Type: Article

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