Uncertainty of Governmental Relief and the Crowding out of Flood Insurance

Environmental and Resource Economics

Volumn 54, Issue 2, 2013, Pages 179-200

  Raschky, Paul A ^a   Schwarze, Reimund ^b,c   Schwindt, Manijeh ^d   Zahn, Ferdinand ^e  

^a MONASH UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

^b HELMHOLTZ CENTRE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH UFZ   (Germany)

^c EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY VIADRINA   (Germany)

^d UNIVERSITY OF INNSBRUCK   (Austria)

^e UNIVERSITY OF MUNICH   (Germany)

Author keywords

Governmental relief; Insurance demand; Natural hazards

Indexed keywords

DECISION MAKING; DISASTER PREVENTION; HAZARDS;

CO-EXISTING; CROWDING OUT; DISASTER RELIEF; GOVERNMENTAL RELIEF; INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN; NATURAL HAZARD; POLITICAL DECISION; RELIEF PROGRAMS;

FLOOD INSURANCE;

DECISION MAKING; DISASTER MANAGEMENT; FLOODING; GOVERNANCE APPROACH; INSURANCE SYSTEM; PRIVATE SECTOR; UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS;

AUSTRIA; GERMANY;

EID: 84872929443     PISSN: 09246460     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10640-012-9586-y     Document Type: Article

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