Charity hazard-A real hazard to natural disaster insurance?

Environmental Hazards

Volumn 7, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 321-329

  Raschky, Paul A ^a,b   Weck Hannemann, Hannelore ^a,b  

^a alpS Zentrum fur Naturgefahren Management   (Austria)

^b UNIVERSITY OF INNSBRUCK   (Austria)

Author keywords

Governmental assistance; Market failure; Natural hazard insurance

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS; HAZARD ASSESSMENT; INSURANCE SYSTEM; NATURAL DISASTER; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 36549047904     PISSN: 17477891     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.envhaz.2007.09.002     Document Type: Article

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