Adverse selection in an insurance market with government-guaranteed subsistence levels

Journal of Risk and Insurance

Volumn 72, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 61-75

  Kim, Bum J ^a   Schlesinger, Harris ^b,c  

^a CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b University of Alambama   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF KONSTANZ   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 16244415851     PISSN: 00224367     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.0022-4367.2005.00116.x     Document Type: Article

References (7)

1. Kaplow, L., 1991, Incentives and Government Relief for Risk, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 4: 167-175.
2. Miyazaki, H., 1977, The Rat Race and Internal Labor Markets, Bell Journal of Economics, 8: 394-418.
3. Mossin, J., 1968, Aspects of Rational Insurance Purchasing, Journal of Political Economy, 79: 553-568.
4. Rothschild, M., and J. Stiglitz, 1976, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 90: 629-650.
5. Shavell, S., 1986, The Judgment Proof Problem, International Review of Law and Economics, 6: 45-58.
6. Spence, M., 1978, Product Differentiation and Performance in Insurance Markets, Journal of Public Economics, 10: 427-447.
7. Wilson, C., 1977, A Model of Insurance Markets With Incomplete Information, Journal of Economic Theory, 12: 167-207.