The political economy of FEMA disaster payments

Economic Inquiry

Volumn 41, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 496-509

  Garrett, Thomas A ^a   Sobel, Russell S ^b  

^a FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST LOUIS   (United States)

^b WEST VIRGINIA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0043071582     PISSN: 00952583     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/ei/cbg023     Document Type: Article

References (24)

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