Optimal Loss Mitigation and Contract Design

Journal of Risk and Insurance

Volumn 70, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 53-72

  Kelly, Mary ^b   Kleffner, Anne E ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY   (Canada)

^b NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0242362234     PISSN: 00224367     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1539-6975.00047     Document Type: Article

References (24)

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