Modes and models in disorders of consciousness science

Archives Italiennes de Biologie

Volumn 150, Issue 2-3, 2012, Pages 172-184

  Boly, M ^a   Seth, A K ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LIÈGE   (Belgium)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SUSSEX   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Neuroimaging; Theories of consciousness; Vegetative state

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; BIOLOGICAL MODEL; BRAIN; CONSCIOUSNESS DISORDER; HUMAN; NEUROIMAGING; PATHOLOGY; PATHOPHYSIOLOGY;

BRAIN; CONSCIOUSNESS DISORDERS; HUMANS; MODELS, BIOLOGICAL; NEUROIMAGING;

EID: 84872400285     PISSN: 00039829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

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