Water quality trading with asymmetric information, uncertainty and transaction costs: A stochastic agent-based simulation

Resource and Energy Economics

Volumn 35, Issue 1, 2013, Pages 60-90

  Nguyen, N P ^a   Shortle, J S ^a   Reed, P M ^a   Nguyen, T T ^b  

^a PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA   (Canada)

Author keywords

Agent based model; Asymmetric information; Bilateral negotiations; Bounded rationality; Clearinghouse; Differential Evolutionary algorithm; Environmental markets; Transaction costs; Uncertainty; Water quality trading

Indexed keywords

AGENT-BASED MODEL; ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION; BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS; BOUNDED RATIONALITY; CLEARINGHOUSE; DIFFERENTIAL EVOLUTIONARY ALGORITHM; ENVIRONMENTAL MARKET; TRANSACTION COST; UNCERTAINTY; WATER QUALITY TRADING;

COMPUTER SIMULATION; COSTS; DECISION MAKING; EVOLUTIONARY ALGORITHMS; STOCHASTIC SYSTEMS; WATER QUALITY;

COMMERCE;

ALGORITHM; COMPUTER SIMULATION; DECISION MAKING; POLLUTION CONTROL; STOCHASTICITY; TRANSACTION COST; UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS; WATER QUALITY; BILATERAL AGREEMENT; EMISSIONS TRADING; ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS; ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION; MARKET SYSTEM;

EID: 84871494904     PISSN: 09287655     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.reseneeco.2012.09.002     Document Type: Article

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