Agent-based computational models and generative social science

Complexity

Volumn 4, Issue 5, 1999, Pages 41-60

  Epstein, Joshua M ^a,b  

^a BROOKINGS INSTITUTION   (United States)

^b SANTA FE INSTITUTE   (United States)

Author keywords

Agent based models; Artificial societies; Philosophy of social science

Indexed keywords

EID: 70849133696     PISSN: 10762787     EISSN: 10990526     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/(SICI)1099-0526(199905/06)4:5<41::AID-CPLX9>3.0.CO;2-F     Document Type: Article

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