Traveling agents: Political change and bureaucratic turnover in India

Review of Economics and Statistics

Volumn 94, Issue 3, 2012, Pages 723-739

  Iyer, Lakshmi ^a   Mani, Anandi ^b  

^a HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84871163658     PISSN: 00346535     EISSN: 15309142     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/REST_a_00183     Document Type: Article

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