Are politicians really paid like bureaucrats?

Journal of Law and Economics

Volumn 47, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 477-513

  Tella, Rafael D I ^a   Fisman, Raymond ^b  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b Och Spine at New York Presbyterian Hospitals   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 10244229788     PISSN: 00222186     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/422983     Document Type: Review

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