Relativism and Confirmation Theory

A Companion to Relativism

Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages 242-265

  Douven, Igor ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LEUVEN   (Belgium)

Author keywords

Bayesian definition of confirmation; Bayesian literature, discussion of candidates for additional rationality requirements; Bayesian Paradigm that Bayesian confirmation theory, currently by far the most popular approach to confirmation; Confirmation theoretic issues that one could be relativist about; Confirmation theory, how evidence bears upon hypotheses; Failed attempts at developing confirmation theories, evidence against their existence; Philosophers holding that confirmation is relativist; Problem specifically for the HD account logically incompatible hypotheses; Relativism and confirmation theory; Twentieth century confirmation theory special eye toward relativist aspects of the best known theories

Indexed keywords

EID: 84867550992     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1002/9781444392494.ch13     Document Type: Chapter

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