Environmental quality and welfare effects of improving the reporting capability of citizen monitoring schemes

Journal of Regulatory Economics

Volumn 42, Issue 3, 2012, Pages 264-286

  Goeschl, Timo ^a   Jürgens, Ole ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HEIDELBERG   (Germany)

Author keywords

Citizen monitoring; Environmental regulation; Sampling technology

Indexed keywords

EID: 84867332743     PISSN: 0922680X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11149-012-9191-6     Document Type: Article

References (46)

1. Abreu D. (1988) On the theory of infinitely repeated games with discounting. Econometrica 56(2): 383-396.
2. Afsah, S., Laplante, B., & Wheeler, D. (1996). Controlling industrial pollution: A new paradigm. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 1672.
3. Aumann, R. J., & Shapley, L. S. (1992). Long-term competition-a game-theoretic analysis. Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and University of California at Los Angeles, WP-676.
4. Benoit J.-P., Krishna V. (1985) Finitely repeated games. Econometrica 53(4): 905-922.
5. Blackman A. (2000) Informal sector pollution control: What policy options do we have?. World Development 28(12): 2067-2082.
6. Blackman A., Bannister G. J. (1998) Community pressure and clean technology in the informal sector: An econometric analysis of the adoption of propane by traditional Mexican brickmakers. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 35(1): 1-21.
7. Cho I.-K., Kreps D. M. (1987) Signaling games and stable equilibria. Quarterly Journal of Economics 102(2): 179-221.
8. Conrad C., Daoust T. (2008) Community-based monitoring frameworks: Increasing the effectiveness of environmental stewardship. Environmental Management 41(3): 358-366.
9. Conrad C., Hilchey K. G. (2011) A review of citizen science and community-based environmental monitoring: Issues and opportunities. Environmental Monitoring and Assessment 176: 273-291.
10. Cutter W. B., Neidell M. (2009) Voluntary information programs and environmental regulation: Evidence from 'Spare the Air'. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 58(3): 253-265.
11. Dasgupta, S., & Wheeler, D. (1996). Citizen complaints as environmental indicators: Evidence form China. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 1704.
12. Dasgupta, S., Laplante, B., Mamingi, N., & Wang, H. (2000). Industrial environmental performance in China: The impact of inspections. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2285.
13. Eckert, H. L. (2006). Public complaints and Alberta's environmental regulation. Topics in Economic Analysis and Policy, 6(1), Article 20.
14. Escobar, N., & Chávez, C. (2010). Monitoring, firms' compliance, and imposition of fines: Evidence from the federal industrial inspection program in Mexico city. Unpublished manuscript.
15. Evans M. F., Gilpatric S. M., Liu L. (2009) Regulation with direct benefits of information disclosure and imperfect monitoring. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 57(3): 284-292.
16. Friedman J. W. (1971) A non-cooperative equilibrium for supergames. Review of Economic Studies 38(1): 1-12.
17. Fudenberg D., Tirole J. (1991) Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium. Journal of Economic Theory 53(2): 236-260.
18. Garoupa N. (2001) Optimal law enforcement when victims are rational players. Economics of Governance 2(3): 231-242.
19. Goeschl, T., & Jürgens, O. (2012). Explaining uniformity in rule design: The role of citizen participation in enforcement. International Review of Law and Economics. doi: 10. 1016/j. irle. 2011. 12. 002.
20. Graff Zivin J., Neidell M. (2009) Days of haze: Environmental information disclosure and intertemporal avoidance behavior. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 58(2): 119-128.
21. Hartman, R. S., Huq, M., & Wheeler, D. (1997). Why paper mills clean up: Determinants of pollution abatement in four Asian countries. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 1710.
22. Heiman M. K. (1997) Science by the people: Grassroots environmental monitoring and the debate over scientific expertise. Journal of Planning and Education 16(4): 291-299.
23. Hettige H., Huq M., Pargal S., Wheeler D. (1996) Determinants of pollution abatement in developing countries: Evidence from South and Southeast Asia. World Development 24(12): 1891-1904.
24. Heyes A. G. (1998) Making things stick: Enforcement and compliance. Oxford Review of Economic Policy 14(4): 50-63.
25. Heyes A. G. (2002) A theory of filtered enforcement. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 43(1): 34-46.
26. Heyes A. G., Rickman N. (1999) Regulatory dealing-revisiting the Harrington paradox. Journal of Public Economics 72(3): 361-378.
27. Huang H., Miller G. Y. (2006) Citizen complaints, regulatory violations, and their implications for Swine operations in Illinois. Review of Agricultural Economics 28(1): 89-110.
28. Hunsberger C. A., Gibson R. B., Wismer S. K. (2005) Citizen involvement in sustainability-centred environmental assessment follow-up. Environmental Impact Assessment Review 25(6): 609-627.
29. Kathuria V. (2007) Informal regulation of pollution in a developing country: Evidence from India. Ecological Economics 63(2-3): 403-417.
30. Langpap C. (2007) Pollution abatement with limited enforcement power and citizen suits. Journal of Regulatory Economics 37(1): 57-81.
31. Langpap C. (2008) Self-reporting and private enforcement in environmental regulation. Environmental and Resource Economics 40(4): 489-506.
32. Langpap C., Shimshack J. P. (2010) Private citizen suits and public enforcement: Substitutes or complements?. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 59(3): 235-249.
33. Naysnerski W., Tietenberg T. (1992) Private enforcement of federal environmental law. Land Economics 68(1): 28-48.
34. O'Rourke D., Macey G. P. (2003) Community environmental policing: Assessing new strategies of public participation in environmental regulation. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 22(3): 383-414.
35. Ottinger G. (2010) Buckets of resistance: Standards and the effectiveness of citizen science. Science, Technology and Human Values 35(2): 244-270.
36. Overdevest C., Mayer B. (2008) Harnessing the power of information through community monitoring: Insights from social science. Texas Law Review 86(7): 1493-1526.
37. Pargal S., Wheeler D. (1996) Informal regulation of industrial pollution in developing countries: Evidence from Indonesia. Journal of Political Economy 104(6): 1314-1327.
38. Pargal S., Hettige H., Singh M., Wheeler D. (1997) Formal and informal regulation of industrial pollution: Comparative evidence from Indonesia and the United States. World Bank Economic Review 11(3): 433-450.
39. Rubinstein A. (1979) Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion. Journal of Economic Theory 21(1): 1-9.
40. Savan B., Morgan A. J., Gore C. (2003) Volunteer environmental monitoring and the role of the universities: The case of citizens' environment watch. Environmental Management 31(5): 561-568.
41. Sharpe A., Conrad C. (2006) Community based ecological monitoring in Nova Scotia: Challenges and opportunities. Environmental Monitoring and Assessment 113: 395-409.
42. Takáts, E. (2009). A theory of "Crying Wolf": The economics of money laundering enforcement. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. doi: 10. 1093/jleo/ewp018.
43. Thompson B. H. Jr. (2000) The continuing innovation of citizen enforcement. University of Illinois Law Review 2000(1): 185-236.
44. Tietenberg T. (1998) Disclosure strategies for pollution control. Environmental and Resource Economics 11(3-4): 587-602.
45. Tietenberg T., Wheeler D. (2001) Empowering the community: Information strategies for pollution control. In: Folmer H., Landel Gabel H., Gerking S., Rose A. (eds) Frontiers of environmental economics. Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, Northampton, MA.
46. Weersink A., Raymond M. (2007) Environmental regulations impact on agricultural spills and citizen complaints. Ecological Economics 60(3): 654-660.