Self-reporting and private enforcement in environmental regulation

Environmental and Resource Economics

Volumn 40, Issue 4, 2008, Pages 489-506

  Langpap, Christian ^a  

^a OREGON STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Citizen suits; Compliance; Enforcement; Environmental regulation; Pollution control; Private enforcement; Self reporting

Indexed keywords

ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT; ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS; ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION; LAWS AND LEGISLATION;

BUSINESS MEDIA; ENFORCEMENT COSTS; INSPECTION COSTS; SOCIAL COSTS; SPRINGER (CO);

ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS;

COMPLIANCE; ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION; POLLUTION CONTROL;

EID: 46649105940     PISSN: 09246460     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10640-007-9166-8     Document Type: Article

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