Regulation with direct benefits of information disclosure and imperfect monitoring

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

Volumn 57, Issue 3, 2009, Pages 284-292

  Evans, Mary F ^a   Gilpatric, Scott M ^a   Liu, Lirong ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE   (United States)

^b SAM HOUSTON STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Compliance; Environmental regulation; Pollution control; Self reporting

Indexed keywords

COMPLIANCE; EMISSIONS TAXES; EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS; HARMFUL EMISSIONS; INFORMATION DISCLOSURES; OPTIMAL DESIGNS; POLICY-MAKERS; PRIVATE INFORMATIONS; SELF-REPORTING; SOCIAL COSTS;

ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS; LAWS AND LEGISLATION; POLLUTION INDUCED CORROSION;

POLLUTION CONTROL;

COMPLIANCE; ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS; ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION; INCENTIVE; POLLUTION; POLLUTION TAX; TRADE-OFF;

EID: 64049108888     PISSN: 00950696     EISSN: 10960449     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2008.08.003     Document Type: Article

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