Regulatory dealing - Revisiting the Harrington paradox

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 72, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 361-378

  Heyes, Anthony ^a   Rickman, Neil ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LONDON   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SURREY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Enforcement; Environmental regulation

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033147956     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(98)00098-X     Document Type: Article

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