Adaptive skeletal muscle action requires anticipation and "conscious broadcasting"

Frontiers in Psychology

Volumn 3, Issue SEP, 2012, Pages

  Poehlman, T Andrew ^a   Jantz, Tiffany K ^b   Morsella, Ezequiel ^b,c  

^a SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b SAN FRANCISCO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Anticipation; Consciousness; Ideomotor action; Skeletal muscle; Voluntary action

Indexed keywords

EID: 84867041672     PISSN: None     EISSN: 16641078     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00369     Document Type: Review

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