Two takes on a one-level account of consciousness

Psyche

Volumn 12, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 1-9

  Zahavi, Dan ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF COPENHAGEN   (Denmark)

Author keywords

Brentano; Higher order theories; Husserl; Pre reflective; Self consciousness

Indexed keywords

EID: 33745829030     PISSN: 1039723X     EISSN: 1039723X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (22)

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