CEO pay-for-performance heterogeneity using quantile regression

Financial Review

Volumn 45, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 1-19

  Hallock, Kevin F ^a   Madalozzo, Regina ^b   Reck, Clayton G ^c  

^a NBER ^*  (United States)

^b Ibmec   (Brazil)

^c CRA International   (United States)

Author keywords

Executive compensation; Pay and performance; Quantile regression

Indexed keywords

EID: 84866386800     PISSN: 07328516     EISSN: 15406288     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6288.2009.00235.x     Document Type: Article

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