The self and its brain

Social Cognition

Volumn 30, Issue 4, 2012, Pages 474-518

  Klein, Stanley B ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84865713298     PISSN: 0278016X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1521/soco.2012.30.4.474     Document Type: Article

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