What Are We?: A Study in Personal Ontology

What Are We?: A Study in Personal Ontology

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 1-288

  Olson, Eric T ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SHEFFIELD   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Composition; Material object; Mereological; Metaphysical; Ontology; Organism; Part; Personal identity; Soul; Temporal part

Indexed keywords

EID: 70350056692     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195176421.001.0001     Document Type: Book

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