Beyond Reduction: Philosophy of Mind and Post-Reductionist Philosophy of Science

Beyond Reduction: Philosophy of Mind and Post-Reductionist Philosophy of Science

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 1-240

  Horst, Steven ^a  

^a WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Cognitive pluralism; Dualism; Explanation; Explanatory gap; Metaphysics; Mind; Mysterianism; Naturalism; Nonreductive materialism; Philosophy of mind; Philosophy of science; Pluralism; Reduction

Indexed keywords

EID: 78650288180     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195317114.001.0001     Document Type: Book

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