The European Redistributive State and a European Law of Struggle

European Law Journal

Volumn 18, Issue 5, 2012, Pages 667-693

  Chalmers, Damian ^a  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

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EID: 84864986619     PISSN: 13515993     EISSN: 14680386     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0386.2012.00623.x     Document Type: Article

References (127)

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68. http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/07/us-eurozone-france-letter-idUSTRE7B612Y20111207
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71. Stability Treaty, Art 3(1)(b). This provision also requires the Commission to propose a time frame for each State taking account of what is sustainable.
72. Art 126(1) TFEU.
73. Crudely, this is the difference between government spending and government revenue.
74. Art 126(2) TFEU; Protocol 12 to the TEU on the Excessive Deficit Procedure, Art 1; Preamble to the Stability Treaty, alinea 4.
75. Art 126(2)(a) TFEU when read with Protocol 12 on the Excessive Deficit Procedure, Art 1.
76. Art 126(2)(b) TFEU.
77. Euro-area debt stood at 88% of GDP in Autumn 2011. This would involve the euro repaying debt at the rate of almost 1.5% of GDP per annum. There are significant discrepancies between States, however. States with debt above or near 100% of GDP include Belgium (97.2%); Portugal (101.2%); Ireland (108.5%); Italy (120.5%); Greece (162.5%). http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/key_indicators/documents/key_indicators_en.pdf
78. http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/deficit/index_en.htm .2012
79. Art 126(6) TFEU.
80. Stability Treaty, Art 5.
81. European Commission, EMU@10: Successes and Challenges after 10 Years of Economic and Monetary Union: European Economy 2 2008 (European Commission, ), at 8-9 & 64.2008
82. European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation on the Prevention and Correction of Macroeconomic Imbalances, COM (2010) 527, 2-3.
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84. Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Hungary, Italy, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Details are provided at http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/macroeconomic_imbalance_procedure/index_en.htm2012
85. France, Hungary, Italy and Slovenia.
86. Cyprus and Spain.
87. External imbalances include those arising from the evolution of national current account and net investment positions; real effective exchange rates; export market shares; changes in price and cost developments; and non-price competitiveness.
88. European Commission, 'Technical Note: The Commission Services' Method for the Cyclical Adjustment of Government Budget Balances' (1995, no. 60 European Economy, Brussels). On the debate see, R. Hagemann, The Structural Budget Balance: The IMF's Methodology (, IMF Working Paper 99/95, Washington) 4 et seq.1999
89. In 1997, the structural deficit of France was calculated at 0.8% of GDP by the IMF and 1.75% by the Commission C. Bouthevillain and A. Quinet, 'The Relevance of Cyclically Adjusted Public Balance Indicators-The French Case' Paper presented at Indicators of Structural Budget Balances Conference, Banca D'Italia Perugia 26-28 November 1998. http://www.bancaditalia.it/studiricerche/convegni/atti/structural_bud_bal/iv/325-352_bouthevillain_and_quinet_2.pdf
90. Art 126(2)(a) TFEU when read with Protocol 12 on the Excessive Deficit Procedure, Art 1.eg
91. European Commission, On the Existence of an Excessive Deficit in Germany , COM (2003)
92. European Commission, On the Existence of an Excessive Deficit in Portugal , SEC (2002) 1118.
93. European Commission, On the Existence of an Excessive Deficit in France , SEC (2003) 515
94. European Commission, On the Existence of an Excessive Deficit in the Netherlands , SEC (2004) 625.
95. European Commission, Recommendation for a Council Decision on the Existence of an Excessive Deficit in Greece , SEC (2004) 815.
96. Art 126(2)(b) TFEU.
97. The Council recommendation to Austria asked it 'to specify the measures that are necessary to achieve the correction of the excessive deficit by 2013, cyclical conditions permitting' and 'to seize opportunities ... to accelerate the reduction of the gross debt' in addition to allocation 0.75% of GDP to debt reduction. 2009
98. EU Council, Recommendation to Austria with a View to Bringing an End to the Situation of an Excessive Government Deficit , EU Council 15753/09.
99. In December 2009, the Council revised earlier Recommendations to France, Ireland (revised again in 2010) and Spain EU Council, Recommendation to France with a View to Bringing an End to the Situation of an Excessive Government Deficit , EU Council 15762/09; EU Council, Recommendation to Spain with a View to Bringing an end to the Situation of an Excessive Government Deficit , EU Council 15764/09; EU Council, Recommendation with a View to Bringing to an End the Situation of an Excessive Deficit in Ireland , EU Council 17210/10.
100. This took place in March 2012. The Commission briefed that Spain was likely to be sanctioned as a result of a revised government budget deficit of 8.5% of GDP and an admission that previous statistics were misleading. In the event, the Council took the view that the new government was taking sufficient action and sanctions would be counter-productive. S. Castel, 'Spain's Plea for Fiscal Leniency Challenges Rules' New York Times , 29 February 2012.
101. V. Pop, 'Spain Gets Controversial Let-Off', EU Observer , 12 March 2012.
102. See the judgments of the German Federal Court in Lisbon Treaty (2010) 2 CMLR 712, para 256; Case 2 BvR 987/10 Monetary Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany , Judgment of 7 September 2011
103. OECD, 'International Budget Practice and Procedures Database' http://www.oecd.org/document/61/0,3746,en_2649_34119_2494461_1_1_1_1,00.html
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105. A. Schick, 'Can National Legislatures Regain an Effective Voice in Budget Policy?' (2002) 1(3) OECD Journal on Budgeting 15.
106. G. Kirchgässner, 'The Effects of Fiscal Institutions on Public Finance: A Survey of the Empirical Evidence' (2001, CESifo Working Paper 617, Munich).
107. J. Wehner, Legislatures and the Budget Process: The Myth of Fiscal Control (Palgrave, Basingstoke, ), especially Chapter 5.2010
108. J. Wehner, 'Budget Reform and Legislative Control in Sweden', (2007) 14 JEPP 303.
109. European Commission,
110. Proposal for a Regulation on common provision for monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive deficit of Member States in the euro area , COM () 821, Art 3(3).2011
111. Stability Treaty, Art 12.
112. Stability Treaty, Art 13. The entitlements of the British and Czech parliaments are unclear. As these States are not party to the Stability Treaty, this would suggest their exclusion. However, the fields in question fall within the aegis of the TFEU and the Stability Treaty cannot restrict the rights of the latter under the former, Stability Treaty, Art 2(2).
113. For the excessive deficit procedure, reverse QMV is provided in Stability Treaty, Art 7. This is subject to some doubt as the Stability Treaty claims not to amend the TFEU which provides for QMV, Art 126(6) TFEU.
114. Art 126(8) TFEU.
115. I. Ayres and J. Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (OUP, New York, 1992), at 35.
116. J. Black, 'Critical Reflections on Regulation' (2002, CARR Discussion Paper no. 4, LSE) 6.
117. The Hungarian Prime Minister told the Union not to treat Hungary like a 'colony'. BBC News, 'Hungarian PM Viktor Orban denounces EU's "colonialism"', 16 March 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-17394894
118. European Commission, 'The operating framework for the European Regulatory Agencies', COM (2002) 718.
119. D. Chalmers, 'Risk, Anxiety and the European Mediation of the Politics of Life', (2005) 30 ELRev 649.
120. The furious criticism by Ireland and Germany for negative evaluations of their budgetary performance, M. Maclaren, 'Der blaue Brief: A Case Study in the Nature of Law and Sanctions', (2002) 3 German Law Journal 145.
121. The management commitment procedure which existed prior to the Lisbon Treaty reforms of comitology. A vote was almost never taken.
122. D. Chalmers et?al., European Union Law (CUP, 2nd edn, Cambridge, 2010), at 119-120.
123. A. Warntjen, 'Between bargaining and deliberation: decision-making in the Council of the European Union', (2010) 17 JEPP 665.
124. The timetable is set out at http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/articles/euro/documents/com_367_european_semester_en.pdf
125. I am indebted to Christian Joerges for this point. On the influence of this notion see, C. Joerges, 'Europe: A Grossraum? Shifting Legal Conceptions of the European Integration Project', in C. Joerges & G. Singh Galeigh (eds), Darker Legacies of Law in Europe: The Shadow of National Socialism and Fascism over Europe and its Legal Traditions (Hart, Oxford, 34167
126. S. Elden, 'Reading Schmitt Geopolitically: Nomos, Territory and Großraum', (2010) 161 Radical Philosophy 18.
127. Only 65% of Greek voters, notwithstanding that it is compulsory in Greece. 'Austerity Meets Voter Backlash in France, Greece' CBS News, 7 May 2012. http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-202_162-57428941/austerity-meets-voter-backlash-in-greece-france/.