Gossip for social control in natural and artificial societies

SIMULATION

Volumn 88, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 18-32

  Giardini, Francesca ^a   Conte, Rosaria ^b  

^a CENTRAL EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY   (Hungary)

^b INSTITUTE OF COGNITIVE SCIENCES AND TECHNOLOGIES   (Italy)

Author keywords

agent based simulation; cognitive modeling; evolution of cooperation; gossip; punishment; reputation; social control

Indexed keywords

AGENT BASED SIMULATION; COGNITIVE MODELING; EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION; GOSSIP; PUNISHMENT; REPUTATION; SOCIAL CONTROL;

CIRCUIT SIMULATION; SOFTWARE ENGINEERING;

MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS;

EID: 84864455578     PISSN: 00375497     EISSN: 17413133     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0037549711406912     Document Type: Article

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