Deliberative adjustments of intuitive anchors: The case of diversification behavior

Synthese

Volumn 189, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 131-145

  Ayal, Shahar ^a   Zakay, Dan ^a   Hochman, Guy ^b  

^a INTERDISCIPLINARY CENTER   (Israel)

^b DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Diversification behavior; Dual systems; Rationality; Thinking styles

Indexed keywords

EID: 84864205414     PISSN: 00397857     EISSN: 15730964     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-012-0156-1     Document Type: Article

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