The Perceived Diversity Heuristic: The Case of Pseudodiversity

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

Volumn 96, Issue 3, 2009, Pages 559-573

  Ayal, Shahar ^a,b   Zakay, Dan ^c,d  

^a OPEN UNIVERSITY OF ISRAEL   (Israel)

^b DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

^d INTERDISCIPLINARY CENTER   (Israel)

Author keywords

biases; diversification; framing; heuristics; risk perception

Indexed keywords

ADULT; ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE; ARTICLE; DECISION MAKING; FEMALE; HIGH RISK BEHAVIOR; HUMAN; INTUITION; ISRAEL; MALE; PATHOLOGICAL GAMBLING; PERCEPTION; PHYSIOLOGY; STUDENT; UNCERTAINTY;

ADULT; ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE; CHOICE BEHAVIOR; DECISION MAKING; FEMALE; GAMBLING; HUMANS; INTUITION; ISRAEL; JUDGMENT; MALE; PERCEPTION; RISK-TAKING; STUDENTS; UNCERTAINTY;

EID: 62749117275     PISSN: 00223514     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1037/a0013906     Document Type: Article

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