Multi-agent based experimental analysis on bidding mechanism in electricity auction markets

International Journal of Electrical Power and Energy Systems

Volumn 43, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 696-702

  Liu, Zhen ^a,b   Yan, Jianming ^a   Shi, Yuren ^a   Zhu, Kaiwei ^a   Pu, Gangqing ^a  

^a CHONGQING UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY   (China)

^b TSINGHUA UNIVERSITY   (China)

Author keywords

Electricity market; Market clearing price; Pay as bid

Indexed keywords

ADAPTIVE AGENTS; AUCTION MECHANISMS; BIDDING MECHANISM; COMPARE AND ANALYZE; DEREGULATED ELECTRICITY MARKET; ELECTRICITY AUCTION MARKET; ELECTRICITY MARKET; EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS; MARKET CLEARING PRICE; MARKET POWER; MARKET PRICE; MARKET PRICING; PAY AS BID; PRICE VOLATILITY; SIMULATION EXPERIMENTS;

COMMERCE; COSTS; ELECTRICITY; EXPERIMENTS; LEARNING ALGORITHMS; REINFORCEMENT LEARNING;

DEREGULATION;

EID: 84863532762     PISSN: 01420615     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijepes.2012.05.056     Document Type: Article

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