Analyzing oligopolistic electricity market using coevolutionary computation

IEEE Transactions on Power Systems

Volumn 21, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 143-152

  Chen, H ^a,b   Wong, K P ^a   Nguyen, D H M ^a   Chung, C Y ^a  

^a HONG KONG POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY   (Hong Kong)

^b XI'AN JIAOTONG UNIVERSITY   (China)

Author keywords

Coevolutionary computation (CCEM); Cournot oligopoly; Market simulation; Pareto improvement

Indexed keywords

ELECTRIC INDUSTRY; ELECTRIC LOAD MANAGEMENT; EVOLUTIONARY ALGORITHMS; GAME THEORY; GENETIC ALGORITHMS; PARETO PRINCIPLE; STRATEGIC PLANNING;

COEVOLUTIONARY COMPUTATION; COURNOT OLIGOPOLY; ELASTICITY DEMAND FUNCTIONS; ELECTRICITY MARKET ANALYSIS; PARETO IMPROVEMENT;

ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEMS;

EID: 32144448677     PISSN: 08858950     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1109/TPWRS.2005.862005     Document Type: Article

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