Research on incentive bidding mechanism to coordinate the electric power and emission-reduction of the generator

International Journal of Electrical Power and Energy Systems

Volumn 32, Issue 9, 2010, Pages 946-955

  Liu, Zhen ^a   Zhang, Xiliang ^a   Lieu, Jenny ^b   Li, Xiangjun ^a   He, Jiankun ^a  

^a TSINGHUA UNIVERSITY   (China)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SUSSEX   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Coordinate incentive; Environmental pollution; Semi random matching; Signal transduction

Indexed keywords

BIDDING MECHANISM; ELECTRIC POWER; ELECTRIC POWER MARKETS; ELECTRICITY MARKET; ELECTRICITY PRICES; ELECTRICITY PRICING; ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION; ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTIONS; INCENTIVE STRATEGIES; INTERFERENCE SIGNAL; MARKET POWER; POLLUTION EMISSIONS; POWER GENERATORS; SEMI-RANDOM; TACIT COLLUSION;

BACTERIOPHAGES; COMMERCE; COSTS; ELECTRIC INDUSTRY; ELECTRIC NETWORK ANALYSIS; ELECTRICITY; POLLUTION; SIGNAL TRANSDUCTION;

ELECTRIC GENERATORS;

EID: 77955471584     PISSN: 01420615     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijepes.2010.02.011     Document Type: Article

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