Aggregating partially ordered preferences

Journal of Logic and Computation

Volumn 19, Issue 3, 2009, Pages 475-502

  Pini, Maria Silvia ^a   Rossi, Francesca ^a   Venable, Kristen Brent ^a   Walsh, Toby ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PADOVA   (Italy)

^b UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES   (Australia)

Author keywords

Partially ordered preferences; Preference aggregation; Social choice; Strategy proofness

Indexed keywords

ARROW'S THEOREM; IMPOSSIBILITY RESULTS; LINEAR ORDER; MAJORITY VOTING; MONOTONICITY; NATURAL GENERALIZATION; PARTIALLY ORDERED PREFERENCES; PREFERENCE AGGREGATIONS; SOCIAL CHOICE; SOCIAL ORDER; STRATEGY-PROOFNESS;

COMPUTER SCIENCE; FORMAL LOGIC;

LOGIC PROGRAMMING;

EID: 78651261086     PISSN: 0955792X     EISSN: 1465363X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/logcom/exn012     Document Type: Article

References (39)

1. K. J.Arrow. Social Choice and Individual Values. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., NewYork, Chapman & Hall, London, 1951.
2. K. J. Arrow, A. K. Sen and K. Suzumara. Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare. North-Holland, Amsterdam, 2002.
3. S. Barbera. Strategy-proofness and pivotal voters: a direct proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem. International Economic Review, 24, 413-17, 1983.
4. S. Barberà, W. Bossert and P. K. Pattanaik. Handbook of Utility Theory. Volume II Extensions. Kluwer, 2004.
5. S. Barberà, B. Dutta and A. Sen. Strategy-proof social choice correspondences. Journal of Economic Theory, 101, 374-394, 2002.
6. J. P. Barthelemy. Arrow's theorem: unusual domains and extended codomains. Matematical Social Sciences, 3, 79-89, 1982.
7. J.-P. Benoït. Strategic manipulation in voting games when lotteries and ties are permitted. Journal of Economic Theory, 102, 421-436, 2002.
8. J. Doyle and M. P. Wellman. Impediments to universal preference-based default theories. Artificial Intelligence, 49, 97-128, 1991. (Pubitemid 21679935)
9. D. Dubois, H. Fargier and P. Perny. On the limitations of ordinal approaches to decision making. In Proceedings KR 2002, pp. 133-144, Morgan Kaufmann, San Francisco, CA, 2002.
10. J. Duggan and T. Schwartz. Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized. Social Choice and Welfare, 17, 85-93, 2000.
11. A. Feldman. A strategic analysis of nonranked voting systems. SIAM Journal of Applied Mathematics, 35, 488-495, 1978.
12. A. Feldman. Nonmanipulable multi-valued social decision functions. Public Choice, 34, 177-188, 1979.
13. P. C. Fishburn. Impossibility theorems without the social completeness axiom. Econometrica, 42, 695-704, 1974.
14. P. Gärdenfors. Manipulation of social choice functions. Journal of Economic Theory, 13, 217-228, 1976.
15. P. Gärdenfors. On definitions of manipulation of social choice functions. In Aggregation and Revelation of Preferences, Vol. 2, Studies in Public Economics, J. J. Laffont, ed., pp. 29-36. North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1979.
16. J. Geanakoplos. Three brief proofs of Arrow's impossibility theorem. Economic Theory, 26, 211-215, 2005. (Pubitemid 40101416)
17. A. Gibbard. Manipulation of voting schemes: a general result. Econometrica, 41, 587-601, 1973.
18. J. S. Kelly. Strategy-proofness and social choice functions without resoluteness. Econometrica, 45, 439-446, 1977.
19. J. S. Kelly. Arrow Impossibility Theorems. Academic Press, New York, 1978.
20. J. S. Kelly. Social Choice Theory: An introduction. Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1988.
21. K. Konczak. Voting procedures with incomplete preferences. In Proceedings of IJCAI-05 Multidisciplinary Workshop on Advances in Preference Handling, Ronen Brafman and Ulrich Junker, eds, Edinburgh, Scotland, 2005.
22. M. S. Pini, F. Rossi, K. B. Venable, T. Walsh. Incompleteness and incomparability in preference aggregation. InProceedings of IJCAI 2007, pp. 1464-1469, AAAI Press, Menlo Park, CA, 2007.
23. J. Lang, M. S. Pini, F. Rossi, K. B. Venable, T. Walsh. Winner determination in sequential majority voting. In Proceedings of IJCAI 2007, pp. 1372-1377, AAAI Press, Menlo Park, CA, 2007.
24. A. Mas-Colell and H. Sonnenschein. General possibility theorems for group decisions. Review of Economic Studies, 39, 165-192, 1972.
25. E. Muller and M. A. Satterthwaite. The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness. Economic Theory, 14, 412-418, 1977.
26. P. K. Pattanaik. Strategic voting without collusion under binary and democratic group decision rules. The Review of Economic Studies, 42, 93-103, 1975.
27. P. K. Pattanaik. On the stability of sincere voting situations. Journal of Economic Theory, 6, 558-574.
28. M. S. Pini, F. Rossi, K. B. Venable and T. Walsh. Strategic voting when aggregating partially ordered preferences. In Proceedings of AAMAS-06, pp. 685-687, ACM Press, New York, 2006. (Pubitemid 46609537)
29. M. S. Pini, F. Rossi, K. B. Venable, and Toby Walsh. Aggregating partially ordered preferences: impossibility and possibility results. In Proceeding of TARK-05, pp. 193-206. ACM Digital Library, National University of Singapore, 2005. (Pubitemid 43206537)
30. P. Reny. Arrow's theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: a unified approach. Economics Letters, 70, 99-105, 2001. (Pubitemid 33618687)
31. C. Rodriguez-Alvarez. On the manipulation of social choice correspondences. Social Choice and Welfare, 29, 175-199, 2007.
32. S. Sato. On the strategy-proof social choice correspondences. Social Choice and Welfare 29(4), Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg, 2007.
33. M. A. Satterthwaite. Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions. Economic Theory, 10, 187-217, 1975.
34. A. Sen. Collective Choice and Social Wellfare. Holden-Day, 1970.
35. Y. Tanaka. Generalized monotonicity and strategy-proofness for non-resolute social choice correspondences. Economic Bulletin, 4, 1-8, 2001.
36. Y. Tanaka. Oligarchy for social choice correspondences and strategy proofness. Theory and Decision, 55, 273-287, 2003. (Pubitemid 40626125)
37. A. D. Taylor. The manipulability of voting systems. The American Mathematical Monthly, 109, 321-333, 2002.
38. J. A. Weymark. Arrow's theorem with social quasi-orderings. Public Choice, 42, 235-246, 1984.
39. L. Zhou and S. Ching. Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules. Social Choice and Welfare, 19, 569-580, 2002. (Pubitemid 36170800)