Bayesian and Dominant-Strategy Implementation in the Independent Private-Values Model

Econometrica

Volumn 78, Issue 6, 2010, Pages 1905-1938

  Manelli, Alejandro M ^a   Vincent, Daniel R ^b  

^a ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND   (United States)

Author keywords

Adverse selection; Auctions; Bayesian implementations; Bilateral trade; Dominant strategy implementation; Incentive compatibility; Independent private values; Mechanism design

Indexed keywords

EID: 78650059906     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: 14680262     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3982/ECTA8025     Document Type: Article

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