How (far) can rationality be naturalized?

Synthese

Volumn 187, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 243-268

  Gigerenzer, Gerd ^a   Sturm, Thomas ^b  

^a MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR HUMAN DEVELOPMENT   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITAT AUTÒNOMA DE BARCELONA   (Spain)

Author keywords

Heuristics; Judgment and decision making; Rationality; Uncertainty

Indexed keywords

EID: 84863211953     PISSN: 00397857     EISSN: 15730964     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-011-0030-6     Document Type: Article

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