Rationality and the ethics of logic

Journal of Philosophy

Volumn 103, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 67-100

  Hanna, Robert ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 60950356544     PISSN: 0022362X     EISSN: 19398549     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5840/jphil2006103235     Document Type: Article

References (90)

1. Kant, The Jäsche Logic, Lectures on Logic, J.M. Young, trans. (New York: Cambridge, 1992), pp. 521-640, at p. 531.
2. Boole, "Logic and Reasoning, " in Studies in Logic and Probability (London: Watts, 1952), pp. 211-29, at p. 212.
3. Chomsky, Language and Problems of Knowledge (New York: Columbia, 1988), p. 99.
4. nded.), p. 81.
5. Shapiro, "The Status of Logic, " in Paul Boghossian and Christopher Peacocke, eds., New Essays on the A Priori (New York: Oxford, 2000), pp. 333-66, at p. 338.
6. Raz, Engaging Reason (New York: Oxford, 1999), p. 75.
7. Weininger, Sex and Character (London: Heinemann, 1906), p. 159.
8. See John Rawls, "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, " this JOURNAL, LXXVII, 9 (September 1980): 515-72, and sections II-III below.
9. Sober, "Psychologism." Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior, VIII (1978): 165-92, at p. 165.
10. See Jonathan Bennett, Rationality (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989).
11. See Harry Frankfurt, "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, " in The Importance of What We Care About (New York: Cambridge, 1988), pp. 11-25;
12. and Brian O'Shaughnessy, The Will: A Dual Aspect Theory, 2 Volumes (New York: Cambridge, 1980).
13. See Robert Audi, The Architecture of Reason (New York: Oxford, 2001), chapters 1-2 and 4-5;
14. See, for example, Alfred R. Mele and Piers Rawling, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Rationality (New York: Oxford, 2003).
15. rd ed.). Gödel's incompleteness theorems maybe taken to show that validity and soundness outrun provability andcomputability. The precise character of logical validity will vary according towhether the logic is classical or nonclassical, and within nonclassical logics, according to whether the logic is either merely a conservative extension ofclassical logic or a deviant logic. What this means is that not all rationalprocedures are classically logically valid.
16. What I am calling "principled rationality" is closely connectedwith the traditional notion of "pure reason"; see, for example, Laurence Bonjour, In Defense of Pure Reason (New York: Cambridge, 1998).
17. See Rawls, "The Independence of Moral Theory, " Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, XLVIII (1974): 5-22;
18. and Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard, 1971).
19. See Martin Hollis and Robert Sugden, "Rationality in Action, "Mind, CII (1993): 1-35;
20. Donald C. Hubin, "The Groundless Normativity of Instrumental Rationality, " this JOURNAL, XCVIII, 9 (September 2001): 445-68;
21. Robert Nozick, The Nature of Rationality (Cambridge: Harvard, 1993);
22. and Herbert Simon, Reason in Human Affairs (Stanford: University Press, 1983).
23. See Lewis, "Alternative Systems of Logic, " Monist, XLII (1932):481-507;
24. and Rudolf Carnap, The Logical Syntax of Language, Amethe Smeaton, trans.(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1937).
25. See Haack, Deviant Logic (New York: Cambridge, 1974), chapter 1;
26. Haack, Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic (Chicago: University Press, 1996), chapters 1 and 9;
27. and Graham Priest, Introduction to Non-Classical Logic (New York:Cambridge, 2001).
28. See Lewis, Survey of Symbolic Logic (Berkeley: California UP, 1918), chapter V.
29. nd ed.).
30. See Kripke, "Semantical Analysis of Modal Logic I, Normal Propositiona Calculi, " Zeitschrift für mathematische Logik and Grundlagen der Mathematik, IX (1963): 67-96;
31. and Kripke, "Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic, " Acta Philosophica Fennica, XVI (1963): 83-94.
32. See L.E.J. Brouwer, "Historical Background, Principles, and Methodsof Intuitionism, " South African Journal of Science, XLIX (1952): 139-146;
33. Haack, Deviant Logic, chapter 5;
34. and Priest, Introduction to Non-Classical Logic, chapter 6.
35. and Haack, Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic, pp. 229-58.
36. See Priest, In Contradiction (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987);
37. Priest, "The Logic of Paradox, " Journal of Philosophical Logic, VIII (1979): 219-41;
38. and Priest, "What Is So Bad about Contradictions?, " this JOURNAL, XCV, 8 (August 1998): 410-426.
39. See also Hilary Putnam, "There Is at Least One A Priori Truth, "in Putnam, Realism and Reason: Philosophical Papers, Volume 3 (New York:Cambridge, 1983), pp. 98-114.
40. See also Ken Warmbrōd, "Logical Constants, " Mind, CVIII(1999): 503-38.
41. See, for example, Chomsky, Syntactic Structures (The Hague: Mouton, 1957);
42. Chomsky, "Review of B.F. Skinner's Verbal Behavior, " Language, XXXV (1959), 26-58;
43. Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (Cambridge: MIT, 1965);
44. and Chomsky, Knowledge of Language (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1986).
45. nd ed.);
46. and John Lyons, Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics (New York:Cambridge, 1968).
47. Chomsky, Reflections on Language (New York: Pantheon, 1975), pp. 12-13.
48. See Norbert Hornstein, Logic as Grammar (Cambridge: MIT, 1984);
49. and Robert May, Logical Form (Cambridge: MIT, 1985).
50. See, for example, Chomsky, The Minimalist Programme (Cambridge: MIT, 1995);
51. and Chomsky, New Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind (New York:Cambridge, 2000).
52. See John Macnamara, A Border Dispute: The Place of Logic in Psychology(Cambridge: MIT, 1986), chapter 2.
53. A natural logic is the logic that expresses our actual reasoningprocedures. See M. Braine, "On the Relation between the Natural Logic of Reasoning and Standard Logic, " Psychological Review, LXXXV (1978): 1-21;
54. and George Lakoff, "Linguistics and Natural Logic, " in Gilbert Harman and Donald Davidson, eds., Semantics of Natural Language, (Boston:Reidel, 1972), pp. 545-665.
55. See Arnauld and Nicole, Logic or the Art of Thinking, Jill Vance Buroker, trans. (New York: Cambridge, 1996);
56. Stephen Gaukroger, Cartesian Logic (New York: Oxford, 1989);
57. and William Kneale and Martha Kneale, The Development of Logic (New York:Oxford, 1984), pp. 315-20.
58. See Mill, System of Logic (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1879);
59. and Edmund Husserl, Prolegomena to Pure Logic, in Logical Investigations, Volumes 1-2 J.N. Findlay, trans. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970), Volume 1, pp. 51-247, at p. 76.
60. See, for example, Michael Resnik, "Logic: Normative or Descriptive?The Ethics of Belief or a Branch of Psychology?, " Philosophy of Science, LII (1985): 221-38;
61. and Resnik, "Ought There to Be But One Logic?, " in B.J.Copeland, ed., Logic and Reality: Essays on the Legacy of Arthur Prior (New York: Oxford, 1996), pp. 489-517, at pp. 510-14.
62. Frege, Basic Laws of Arithmetic M. Furth trans. (Berkeley: California UP, 1964), p. 12.
63. rd ed.), p. 4;
64. thed.), p. 2;
65. and Wesley Salmon, Logic (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1963), p.8.
66. Russell, Autobiography (London: Unwin, 1975), p. 330.
67. See Husserl, Prolegomena to Pure Logic, chapters 1-3.
68. See Gerhard Gentzen, "Investigations into Logical Deduction, "in The Collected Papers of Gerhard Gentzen, Mary Szabo, trans. (Amsterdam: North Holland, 1969), pp. 68-131.
69. See Thomas Ricketts, "Frege, the Tractatus, and the Logocentric Predicament, " Philosophers' Annual, VIII (1985): 247-59.
70. See Robert Hanna, Rationality and Logic (Cambridge: MIT, forthcoming), chapter 1.
71. It is also true that some versions of the thesis that logic isintrinsically hypothetically normative are non-psychologistic. See, for example, Resnik, "Logic: Normative or Descriptive? The Ethics of Belief or a Branchof Psycholog)?" Still, every psychologistic theory of logic holding thatlogic is intrinsically normative must also hold that logic is hypotheticallynormative.
72. Kant, The Jäsche Logic, p. 529.
73. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A54-55/B78-79.
74. See Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, in Practical Philosophy, Mary Gregor, trans. (New York: Cambridge, 1996), pp. 37-108.
75. See Ralph Wedgwood, "The A Priori Rules of Rationality, "Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LIX (1999): 113-31, especially at p.128.
76. Foot, "Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives, " in Virtues and Vices (Berkeley: California UP, 1978), pp. 157-73.
77. nd ed.), pp. 77-106.
78. See Onora (Nell) O'Neill, Acting on Principle (New York: Columbia, 1975);
79. and O'Neill, Constructions of Reason (New York: Cambridge, 1989).
80. See O'Neill, Constructions of Reason, chapter 11.
81. See also Thomas Hill, "Kantian Constructivism in Ethics, "Ethics, XCIX (1989): 752-70;
82. Rawls, "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory"; and Rawls, "Themes in Kant's Moral Philosophy, " in Eckhart Förster, ed., Kant's Transcendental Deductions (Stanford: University Press, 1989), pp. 81-113.
83. See Peter Wason, "Reasoning, " in Brian Foss, ed., New Horizonsin Psychology (Baltimore: Penguin, 1966), pp. 135-51;
84. Wason, "Reasoning about a Rule, " Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, XX (1968): 273-81;
85. and Wason and Philip Johnson-Laird, The Psychology of Reasoning(Cambridge: Harvard, 1972).
86. Similar results have been discovered in connection with probabilisticreasoning tasks. See Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amis Tversky, eds., Judgment under Uncertainly: Heuristics and Biases (New York: Cambridge, 1982);
87. and Tversky and Kahneman, "Extensional vs. Intuitive Reasoning: The Conjunctive Fallacy in Probability Judgment, " Psychology Review, XC (1983):293-315.
88. Boole, An Investigation of the Laws of Thought (Cambridge: Macmillan, 1854), p. 408.
89. Boole, "Extracts from a Paper Entitled 'On the Mathematical Theoryof Logic and on the Philosophical Interpretations of Its Methods and Processes'(1855 or 1856), " in Boole, Studies in Logic and Probability, pp. 230-46, atp. 246.
90. See, for example, Richard Griggs and James Cox, "The Elusive Thematic Materials Effect in Wason's Selection Task, " British Journal of Psychology, LXXIII (1982): 407-20.