Fodor, Cherniak and the Naturalization of Rationality

Theory & Psychology

Volumn 7, Issue 6, 1997, Pages 799-821

  Chiappe, Dan L ^a   Vervaeke, John ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO   (Canada)

Author keywords

explanation; frame problem; naturalism; rationality; relevance

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031489698     PISSN: 09593543     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0959354397076004     Document Type: Article

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